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Introduction 
 
 
NATO’s Strategic Adaptation 
Germany Is the Backbone for the Alliance’s Military Reorganisation 
Claudia Major 
In reaction to the Ukraine crisis, NATO allies decided at the September 2014 Summit in 
Wales on the most fundamental military adaptation of the Alliance since the end of 
the Cold War. The objective is a large scale reinforcement and reorganisation of defence 
capabilities. Collective defence has thereby been reinstated as the core task of NATO, 
requiring considerable political, military and financial input from all Allies. The focus 
of attention is, however, on Germany. First, Germany played a considerable part in 
shaping the Wales decisions. Second, the partners expect Germany to bear a substantial 
military and financial burden because of its economic strength. Third, Berlin placed 
itself under pressure to promote defence cooperation when it launched the framework 
nation concept in 2013. 
 
The Wales Summit has rung in fundamen-
tal change. Although NATO had given it-
self three equal tasks in its 2010 Strategic 
Concept: collective defence, crisis manage-
ment, cooperative security, in reality, crisis 
management has dominated over recent 
years. In particular, the operation in Af-
ghanistan informed strategic thinking and 
decisions as to how NATO states equip and 
train their soldiers. With the Ukraine crisis, 
collective defence has once again become 
the primus inter pares of NATO tasks. The 
Alliance solidified this at the Wales Sum-
mit with a work programme. The Readiness 
Action Plan (RAP), agreed in Wales, is the 
most important steering instrument with 
which NATO plans to orient its military set-
up once more towards collective defence. 
At their first meeting at the beginning of 
February 2015, NATO defence ministers 
agreed initial proposals for its implement-
tation. The Wales decisions should be im-
plemented as far as possible by the 2016 
NATO Summit in Poland. 
Fundamental change 
The RAP constitutes the starting point for 
a military reorganisation of the Alliance, 
requiring far-reaching changes in planning 
and logistics as well as in equipment and 
exercises. It embraces two areas: short term 
reassurance measures and long-term adap-
tation measures. 
First, the assurance measures agreed 
in spring 2014, shortly after the outbreak 
of the Ukraine crisis, have been carried for-
ward. In so doing the Alliance is signalling 
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to its eastern members, alarmed by Rus-
sian actions, that they can rely on NATO’s 
promise of assistance. These measures are 
to protect those Allies who are particularly 
exposed and deter adversaries. They in-
clude air policing in the Baltic, more AWACS 
flights over Poland and Romania, intensi-
fied maritime surveillance, additional exer-
cises and more personnel for NATO Head-
quarters (HQ). 
Second, the Alliance wants to improve 
its readiness and responsiveness. This means 
creating the planning, logistical and equip-
ment conditions for larger units to be moved 
more rapidly to their theatre of operations 
and enabling them to be more rapidly op-
erational once there, whether on NATO’s 
southern or eastern flank. Whilst crisis man-
agement in Afghanistan involved smaller, 
brigade – sized units (approx. 3,000 men), 
the rapid relocation and command of com-
plex, larger units the size of a division or 
corps are now required. Up to 40,000 (long 
term 100,000) soldiers must be able both 
to reach the area of operations and be able 
to cooperate. 
This adaptation is taking place hand in 
hand with a regional focus and the streng-
thening of regional hubs. The creation of 
small regional integration units (NATO Force 
Integration Units, NFIU) is part of this. Each 
will have approximately 40 men as a visible 
and permanent presence, initially in the 
Baltic states, Poland, Romania and Bulgaria. 
They are to facilitate the rapid relocation of 
armed forces into the region and assist in 
the planning and coordination of training 
and exercises. In addition, regional NATO 
HQs are to take on more responsibility, 
namely the multinational Division Head-
quarters South-East being set up in Roma-
nia and the multinational Corps Headquar-
ters North-East (MNC NE), which Germany, 
Poland and Denmark are jointly running in 
Stettin. The MNC NE will increase its readi-
ness, take on more tasks and will become 
a hub for regional cooperation. In the long 
term it is to command a collective defence 
operation up to the size of a corps in the 
Alliance’s eastern area. 
A further element in this adaptation is 
the reform of the rapid reaction force – the 
NATO Response Force (NRF). An enhanced 
NRF should be deployable more rapidly in 
future. Furthermore, a small, particularly 
rapid, reaction force of around 5,000 men 
(land components) is to be created within 
the NRF to deploy at very short notice – the 
Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF), 
which, despite its defensive nature, is often 
also called spearhead force. Some elements 
of the VJTF are to be deployed in theatre 
within two to three days. An initial exercise 
is planned for April to test alarm mecha-
nisms and readiness times; a further one is 
to follow in June. The various RAP measures 
are clearly interlinked, as the MNC NE is to 
be able to command VJTF deployments from 
2016 and NRF deployments from 2018 in 
the Baltic and in Poland. 
Not a hegemon, but the backbone 
Germany has not only considerably shaped 
this strategic adaption in terms of concepts, 
it is now also laying the foundations for 
its successful implementation in materiel 
terms. Berlin is providing NATO with con-
siderable underpinning, comprising up to 
eight brigades. Within the framework of 
the RAP, Germany has undertaken to make 
substantial contributions. With regard to 
assurance measures it has, for instance, in-
creased its naval participation in the Baltic 
and is sending significantly more soldiers 
on exercise. As for the adaptation measures, 
Berlin is taking part in all NFIUs and doubl-
ing its personnel at MNC NE from 60 to 120 
soldiers. Germany is also the first state to 
take on the command of the new VJTF in 
2015. This means Germany will be testing 
the concepts agreed in February 2015 and 
developing them further, thereby shaping 
the force and presenting a tried and tested 
concept for approval in 2016 at the Poland 
Summit. 
Germany had already agreed with NATO 
in 2013 that it would take its turn serving 
as the lead nation for the then NRF. This 
is why the German-Netherlands Corps in 
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Münster has been in command of the NRF’s 
land forces since January 2015. The Alliance 
has charged the Corps’ headquarters with 
using this year’s exercises to test how a 
spearhead unit can be formed from the 
existing intervention troops and be combat 
ready in any deployment area in a fraction 
of the 30 days initially set for the NRF. Since 
such a unit will require considerable opera-
tional, logistical and planning input, along-
side significant financial expenditure, there 
will first be an interim solution: 2015 the 
Interim VJTF, 2016 an operational VJTF 
and, finally, 2017 the fully operational VJTF. 
During this interim period, not all require-
ments will have to be met; for example, 
forces will not have to be quite as rapidly 
deployable. The current test phase will, 
however, lead the way by laying down the 
foundations of the concept. 
Germany, the Netherlands and Norway 
will provide the majority of the troops 
in the 2015 set-up phase and will bear the 
associated costs. The Bundeswehr and 
the Dutch armed forces contribute by far 
the largest contingents, Germany approxi-
mately 2,700 of the total of some 5,000 
soldiers. As well as the HQ, Germany is 
also providing paratroopers, mechanised 
infantry and transport aircraft. 
At a cursory glance, the German contri-
butions to the RAP appear rather compart-
mentalised: the VJTF, the Stettin head-
quarters, contribution to the re-assurance 
measures, additional personnel for NATO. 
However, in overview it turns out that Ger-
many is providing the backbone for the 
successful implementation of the Wales 
decisions. Without German participation, 
they would be hardly feasible. 
Homework for Berlin 
The new tasks pose political, military and 
financial questions for Berlin. 
Politically, Germany has to be in a posi-
tion to underpin its military contributions. 
It has to create the preconditions for rapid 
decision-making on any deployment and 
Germany’s share therein, including, where 
applicable, in multinational structures. 
This means on the one hand, that for the Bun-
destag to take decisions without delay, it 
has to be informed comprehensively about 
German contributions, about its potential 
role in case NATO’s article 5 is invoked and 
about NATO’s decision-making procedures. 
For example, although NATO can certainly 
launch VJTF alarm exercises, already relo-
cation exercises (that is, when troops move 
to exercise in a different place), require a 
political decision by the North Atlantic 
Council. If involvement of the Bundeswehr 
in armed operations is to be expected, then 
the Bundestag has to vote on it. The upcom-
ing results of the Rühe Commission, which 
is also discussing how to assure both the 
rights of the Bundestag and Berlin’s inter-
national obligations such as in NATO, may 
offer pointers here. A further element is 
better communication with the public about 
how radically the Alliance is changing at 
present, how substantial the German con-
tribution is and why both are necessary. 
On the other hand, the federal government 
should consider together with the Allies 
how the Alliance is to deal with uncon-
ventional threats, often also called hybrid 
threats. The Alliance plans to present a 
concept at the 2016 Summit at the latest. 
According to NATO, it is not only conven-
tional attack that can lead to the invoca-
tion of Collective Defence according to 
Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, but 
also unconventional attack, for example 
by troops without insignia. This is precise-
ly what happened in the Ukraine, which 
is why the eastern Allies in particular want 
to be prepared for such situations. How 
should the Alliance react if the boundary 
between war and no war is fluid, if a case 
of national defence in the classical sense 
does not exist, yet a NATO country is 
being destabilised à la Ukraine. Although 
the invocation of Collective Defence is 
not automatic but will always be a politi-
cal, consensus-driven decision taken by 
the Allies, being acquainted with the argu-
ments, options and decision-making pro-
cesses is indispensable. 
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Militarily, German obligations signify a 
long term, increased requirement for per-
sonnel, equipment and exercises as well as 
the reform of existing plans and processes. 
At present, only the German armoured bri-
gades are fully capable of conducting opera-
tions in line with Article 5 of the Washing-
ton Treaty. And even these brigades would 
have to be supplemented with personnel 
and equipment. Added to this are increased 
logistical requirements. If troops, where 
applicable with heavy equipment, are to 
be relocated faster, then corresponding 
transportation capacity has to be available, 
whether aircraft or flatbed trucks. There 
would have to be increased exercises to meet 
the changed requirements. In the short 
term, military means can be re-tasked. In 
the long term, a robust solution will be 
required to the problem of how more tasks 
can be fulfilled while capabilities stay the 
same or reduce. 
For that challenge, Berlin has already 
proposed a solution that it must now imple-
ment systematically. In 2013 it introduced 
the framework nations concept, according 
to which smaller armies plug specific capa-
bilities into a larger framework nation, 
which forms the organisational backbone 
for the collaboration. The construction 
of such multinational units is supposed to 
increase sustainability and key military 
capabilities. Yet, it is at least just as impor-
tant that the Bundeswehr’s political and 
military ability to cooperate are improved 
if Germany, as a framework nation, wants 
to act even more in future in multinational 
structures. 
Financially, it is questionable whether the 
substantial contributions and the changes 
necessary for these can be borne from cur-
rent funds. Planning is still to be done. But 
if there are to be increased exercises, if 
new equipment is required and used more 
intensively and if more personnel are des-
patched, then costs will also rise. Consider-
ation is, however, being given to reforming 
NATO’s financing mechanisms in order to 
reduce the burden on the larger framework 
nations. Financial resources are also being 
released thanks to the Bundeswehr no 
longer being engaged in Afghanistan to the 
extent it was before. In addition, more effi-
cient cooperation and division of tasks, as 
proposed in the framework nation concept, 
could restrict additional expenditure. But 
even then, the defence budget would have 
to grow over the longer term. For this reason, 
a solid and long term financing plan has to 
be produced for military capabilities and 
activities. 
Contributions allow a say 
Through its substantial military contribu-
tions, Germany is gaining credibility and 
political latitude. Backed by France and 
Great Britain, the federal government had 
rejected alternative reassurance and adap-
tation proposals, for example for a forward 
defence with permanent stationing of sub-
stantial combat troops in eastern Europe. 
This brought Berlin the accusation of being 
too pro-Russian. Amidst all criticism of the 
Russian behaviour, Germany is also push-
ing to keep the dialogue with Moscow, such 
as by summoning the NATO-Russia Council. 
Its intensive participation in the RAP enables 
Berlin to put forward such suggestions with 
more prospect of success and, furthermore, 
to build the profile of a reliable security 
policy player. On the basis of its exemplary 
military contribution, Germany is becom-
ing a recognised political shaper in the 
Alliance. Yet, this is also due to that fact that 
traditional leading states are either occu-
pied by other issues (France in Africa), do 
not have available the necessary means in 
the foreseeable future (Great Britain) or, 
despite providing essential support, want 
to leave the lead on the RAP to the Euro-
peans (the USA). 
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